21 Sept 2026 · Leon
Winning Is Masking a Midfield Problem at Manchester City and Liverpool
Manchester City and Liverpool both won this weekend, but results should not stop us examining what may become a significant weakness for both sides: the balance, mobility and defensive resilience of their midfields.
In fact, City’s 5–3 victory over Sunderland arguably strengthened the concern rather than removing it. Liverpool’s hard-fought 1–0 win at Bournemouth showed that the risk can be managed, but it did not prove it has disappeared.
Both teams are increasingly inclined towards a 4-2-3-1. On paper, it still contains three central midfielders: a double pivot and a number ten. In practice, it can leave a team defending with two midfielders and an attacker.
That distinction could become decisive against stronger, more physical opponents.
The results and our player ratings
These are TouchTight editorial ratings, reflecting each player’s influence, execution, defensive contribution and the context of the match. They are our judgement, not crowd-sourced public scores or automated data ratings.
TouchTight editorial ratings · not public voting
City’s attacking midfielders decided the game, which is why Enzo Fernández, Rayan Cherki and Antoine Semenyo score highly. But conceding a hat-trick at home matters: the team ratings also reflect the space Sunderland found and the difficulty City had controlling transitions.
TouchTight editorial ratings · not public voting
Liverpool’s clean sheet rewards the spine of the side, particularly Virgil van Dijk and Alisson. Florian Wirtz had useful moments between the lines, but Liverpool’s control depended upon the running and defensive support around him rather than Wirtz and Alexis Mac Allister operating alone.
City’s attacking quality comes with a cost
City now possess outstanding technical quality through Cherki and Enzo. Both can receive under pressure, play through compact defensive blocks and create decisive moments around the penalty area.
Their quality was evident against Sunderland, with both players scoring. City also conceded three goals at home. Their midfield helped them win the game, but the overall performance exposed some of the risks associated with the new structure.
The concern is not simply that Cherki and Enzo are relatively small. Size alone does not determine whether a midfield succeeds. Bernardo Silva and David Silva are obvious reminders of that.
The more important questions concern mobility, defensive instinct and positional discipline.
Cherki is fundamentally a creator. As the number ten, he will naturally search for space between the opposition’s midfield and defence. City should not expect him to operate like an additional defensive midfielder.
Enzo can compete physically and work aggressively, but he is not necessarily a midfielder who consistently protects large spaces. He wants to influence the game, move towards the ball and make progressive actions. When those movements take him too high or too far outside the central area, the holding midfielder can become isolated.
We saw evidence of this in the Manchester derby. Elliot Anderson was positioned at the base, with Cherki and Enzo nominally ahead of him. When Enzo moved high or towards the left, Anderson was left responsible for an enormous amount of ground.
That is dangerous against teams built to regain possession and counterattack quickly.
If Cherki and Enzo are both given attacking freedom, City’s deepest midfielder must cover the central area, protect both half-spaces and follow runners arriving from behind. Even an excellent defensive midfielder will struggle to do all three jobs simultaneously.
City can reduce the danger through possession, aggressive counter-pressing and an inverted defender joining midfield. But that protection has to be almost perfectly coordinated. One poor pass or badly timed forward run can expose the whole structure.
Liverpool face a similar question
Liverpool’s situation is not identical, but the central concern is comparable.
Wirtz is at his best as a number ten. He wants to operate between the lines, combine with the forwards and receive in positions from which he can create chances. Building around him makes sense because he is an exceptional attacking talent.
The difficulty comes behind him.
Mac Allister is technically excellent, intelligent and more competitive than his size suggests. However, he is not an explosive defensive midfielder who can repeatedly recover across large distances.
If Liverpool use Mac Allister in a two-man base while Wirtz remains high, the identity of Mac Allister’s partner becomes crucial.
Liverpool did not ask Mac Allister and Wirtz to control the entire midfield against Bournemouth. Dominik Szoboszlai supplied some of the mobility and running the structure required. Ryan Gravenberch can offer similar protection in a different way, using his physical presence and ability to carry the ball through pressure.
But if either Szoboszlai or Gravenberch is removed to accommodate another attacking player, the balance becomes much more questionable. Liverpool could become vulnerable around second balls, outside the double pivot and immediately after losing possession.
Mac Allister and Wirtz may control matches through intelligence and use of the ball. The question is whether they can control the spaces that appear when Liverpool do not have it.
Why the old midfield three offered different protection
Modern formations are fluid. A nominal 4-2-3-1 can become a 3-2-5 in possession and a 4-4-2 without the ball. Nevertheless, the change in responsibilities is real.
In a balanced midfield three, one player can press the ball, another protect the space behind him and the third track a runner or cover the opposite side. In a double pivot, one player moving out can leave the other responsible for almost the entire centre.
The number ten can drop back and help, but that player must do the less glamorous work: closing passing lanes, following runners, contesting second balls and recovering immediately after possession is lost.
A creative number ten who applies pressure only from the front does not necessarily give the team a true third midfielder.
Why Arsenal may be better equipped
Arsenal’s apparent advantage is not simply that they have bigger players. It is the combination of physical capacity and role compatibility.
Declan Rice provides power, recovery speed, defensive awareness and the ability to cover large areas. Arsenal can surround him with players who compete in duels while still contributing in possession.
That offers three potential advantages:
- Ground coverage: Arsenal have midfielders capable of recovering after the first press is beaten.
- Second balls: Their physical presence provides another form of control when possession becomes untidy.
- Margin for error: Losing the ball does not automatically turn every attack into a defensive emergency.
Against City or Liverpool, Arsenal may not need to dominate possession. They can allow the creative midfielders to move forward and then attack the spaces those players leave behind.
Other powerful Premier League midfields will see the same opportunity. Teams with athletic central players, direct forwards and fast transitions may accept long periods without the ball because they believe the important contest begins when City or Liverpool lose it.
What coaches should watch next
Rather than judging the systems only by results, I would watch five details in the next major tests:
- Rest defence: how many players remain goal-side when an attack breaks down?
- Distances: is the double pivot close enough to the number ten to counter-press together?
- Second balls: who reacts first when an opponent bypasses the press with a direct pass?
- Wide transitions: who protects the space outside the pivot when a full-back advances?
- The number ten’s recovery: does the creator become a genuine third midfielder, or stay ahead of the ball?
Those details will tell us more about the sustainability of these systems than the possession percentage alone.
The victories do not end the discussion
Manchester City are winning. Liverpool have collected another three points. Both possess enough attacking quality to overcome structural problems in many matches.
But winning and being well balanced are not always the same thing.
Both teams may have raised their attacking ceiling by using a specialist number ten ahead of two midfielders. At the same time, they may have reduced their defensive margin for error.
Against weaker opposition, technical superiority can conceal that trade-off. Against Arsenal, powerful pressing sides and elite Champions League opponents, it may become much harder to hide.
The defining question is not whether Cherki, Enzo, Mac Allister and Wirtz are individually good enough. Clearly, they are.
The question is whether the structure around them contains enough pace, discipline and defensive power to survive when control of the ball is lost.
This weekend’s victories have not answered that question. If anything, they have made it even more interesting.
Line-ups and scorers checked against the official Manchester City match coverage and official Liverpool match report. Tactical interpretation and player ratings are TouchTight’s own.
Want to explore the coaching detail behind midfield balance? Browse TouchTight’s practices and build your next session around defending transitions, controlling central space and reacting after possession changes.